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NOTES
SECURITIES LAW-ALL IN THE FAMILy-UNITED STATES v.
CHESTMAN: FINDING A FIDUCIARY OR OTHER SIMILAR RELATION
OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE UNDER RULE lOb-5 FOR FAMILY
MEMBERS OF A FAMILy-CONTROLLED PUBLICLY TRADED
CORPORATION
INTRODUCTION
Section lO(b)l and Rule lOb-5 2 compose the government's
most effective weapon against insider trading. 3 While many argu
ments can be made as to their suitability for such a function, due to
1. Manipulative and deceptive devices, 15 v.s.c. § 78j (1988).
Text of section lO(b) states as follows: "It shall be unlawful for any person, directly
or indirectly .... (b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security ... any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe ...." [d.
2. Employment of manipulative and deceptive devices, 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5
(1993).
Rule 10b-5 reads as follows:

It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly ...
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
[d.

3. Some of the other tools in the government's arsenal in the fight against insider
trading include section 14(e) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 V.S.c.
§ 78n(e) (1988); Rule 14e-3(a), transactions in securities on the basis of material, non
public information in the context of tender offers, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a) (1993); In
sider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (codified as
amended at 15 V.S.c. §§ 7Sc, 780, 78t, 78u, 78ff (1988 & Supp. 1993»; Insider Trading
and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677
(codified as amended at 15 V.S.c. §§ 78c, 780, 78t-1, 78u, 78u-1, 78ff, 78kk (1988 &
Supp. 1993»; Mail Fraud Act, ch. 5, §§ 300, 301, 17 Stat. 283 (1872), ch. 321, § 215, 35
Stat. 1088 (1909) (current version at 18 V.S.C. §§ 1341-1342 (1988 & Supp. 1993»;
Wire, Radio, Television Fraud Act, ch. 879, § 18,66 Stat. 711 (1952) (current version at
18 V.S.C. § 1343 (1988 & Supp. 1993».
79
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the current state of the law, no argument can be made against the
statement that section lO(b) and Rule lOb-5 are the best tools the
government possesses in the fight against insider trading.
Yet in United States v. Chestman,4 the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit has created a gaping loophole in the law regarding
section lO(b) and Rule lOb-5 cases, which affects the ability of the
government to successfully prosecute all insider trading activities
on an equal footing.
In United States v. Chestman 5 the Second Circuit, sitting en
banc, reversed the defendant's conviction on ten counts of securi
ties fraud in violation of section lO(b) and Rule lOb-5, but affirmed
the conviction on ten counts of fraudulent trading in connection
with a tender offer in violation of section 14(e)6 and Rule 14e-3(a).7
The defendant, Robert Chestman, was a stockbroker. Upon receiv
ing inside information about the pending sale of the publicly traded
Waldbaum Corporation, Chestman performed trades that person
ally benefitted his clients and himself.s
In reversing Chestman's lOb-5 convictions, the Second Circuit
held that material nonpublic information transferred between fam
ily members within the context of a family-controlled publicly
traded corporation does not create a "fiduciary or similar relation
of trust and confidence."9 The decision has the effect of giving fam
ily members in family-controlled corporations and their tippees
carte blanche to tip and trade on inside information with no restric
tions. 10 In his dissent, Judge Winter proposed a rule to fill the gap
4. 903 F.2d 75, 78-80 (2d Cir. 1990), vacated, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en
banc), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1759 (1992).
5. 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1759 (1992).
6. 15 U.S.c. § 78n(e) (1988).
7. Transactions in securities on the basis of material, nonpublic information in the
context of tender offers, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a) (1993). The section 14(e) and Rule
14e-3(a) violations in Chestman will not be discussed in this Note. For a consideration
of the section 14(e) and Rule 14e-3(a) aspect of Chestman see William J. Cook, Note,
From Insider Trading to Unfair Trading: Chestman II and Rule 14e-3, 22 STETSON L.
REV. 171 (1992).
In the district court, Chestman had also been convicted of ten counts of mail fraud
in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341-1342 (1988), and one count of perjury in violation of 18
U.S.c. § 1621 (1988). Chestman, 903 F.2d at 76. In the en banc consideration by the
Second Circuit, the mail fraud convictions were reversed, the perjury count was not
under consideration, thus the panel's reversal of that conviction stood. Chestman, 947
F.2d at 554.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 79-93.
9. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 567. See also infra note 97 and accompanying text; infra .
text accompanying notes 101-19.
10. The impact of this decision can be seen by looking at the abundance of family
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and successfully net family-members and their tippees involved in
insider trading. l1 Although Judge Winter's rule may be an effective
tool against insider trading, it is unnecessary because the answer
lies within a proper analysis of the case law in the area.
Section I of this Note discusses the traditional and misappro
priation theories of liability under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, as
well as explaining tippee liability. In Section II there is a considera
tion of the Chestman decision, including the dissenting opinion of
Judge Winter. Section III contains a discussion of the circum
stances under which family relationships are or should be consid
ered fiduciary or confidential in nature, and whether there is a
distinction between a fiduciary and confidential relationship and
concludes that there is such a distinction.
I.
A.

BACKGROUND

Legislative History of Section lOeb) and Rule lOb-5

Section lO(b) was a part of the landmark legislation, "The Se
curities Exchange Act of 1934;"12 however, it is unclear whether
Congress intended section lO(b) to be used as a weapon against
insider trading. 13 In the article The Original Conception of Section
lO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, the author argues that section
10(b) "was intended to empower the Securities and Exchange Com
controlled corporations in existence, and by looking at the number of insider trading
cases involving family relations in recent years. See United States v. Chestman, 903
F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1990), vacated, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 1759 (1992); United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other
grounds, 773 F.2d 477 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Willis, 737 F. Supp. 269 (S.D.N.Y.
1990); SEC v. Hurton, 739 F. Supp. 704 (D. Mass. 1990); SEC v. Saul, No. CIV.A90-C
2633,50 SEC Doc. 1171,1992 WL 22730 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 27, 1992); SEC v. Hellberg, No.
CIV.A.89-C-648-A, 1990 WL 321967 (D. Utah Oct. 29, 1990); SEC v. Raab, No.
CIV.A.90-C-3291, 47 SEC Doc. 975, 1990 WL 322278 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 20,1990); SEC v.
Karcher, No. CIV.A88-2021, 40 SEC Doc. 950, 1988 WL 237180 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 14,
1988).
The number of insider trading cases involving family relationships led one critic of
the Chestman decision to observe that "the 'family fact pattern' is standard fare in the
law of insider trading." Karl A Groskaufmanis, Chestman Revisited: The Slow Death
of Fraud, 6 INSIGHTS 12, 19 (1992).
11. See infra text accompanying note 124 for the text of Judge Winter's proposed
rule.
12. 15 U.S.c. §§ 78a-7811 (1988 & Supp. 1993).
13. Michael P. Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L.
REV. 1, 55-69 (1980) (concluding that the legislative history of the 1934 Act indicates
that Congress was not concerned with insider trading); Steve Thel, The Original Con
ception of Section IO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385 (1990)
(history of section 10(b) including legislative history).
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mission (SEC) to· regulate any practice that might contribute to
speculation in securities or tend to move security prices away from
investment value."14 A different position has been proclaimed in
the article Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions. 1s The au
thor argues that "in regulating insider trading under Rule lOb-5 the
lower federal courts and the SEC have, been operating without ben
efit of support from the legislative history of the 1934 Act or from
the language of section lOeb)."16
Even if the 1934 Act did not intend section lO(b) to deal with
insider trading; certain events that have taken place since have
demonstrated that Congress has endorsed just such a purpose for
section lO(b). In The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 and Its
Effect on Existing Law 17 this position is espoused. While an exami
nation of the legislative history suggests Congress did not intend the
Act to apply to a violation along the lines of Rule lOb-5;18
[a] familiar canon ofstatutory construction, ho~ever, is that
when a statute fails to change the prevailing judicial construction
of some prior enacted provision, that failure constitutes an im
plied endorsement of judicial interpretation, at least to the extent
that Congress was aware of the construction and there was a nat
ural opportunity for revision. 19 That maxim applies to the 1984
Act, a fortiori. 20

The promulgation of Rule lOb-5 by the SEC in 1948 was
prompted by the need for a rule to stop the wrongful behavior of a
corporate president in Boston. The president of the company was
fraudulently misrepresenting the financial outlook of the company
to shareholders and then purchasing their shares, having full knowl
edge that the company was in fact doing very well. 21 The SEC
14. Thel, supra note 13, at 385-86. The author comes to this conclusion by exam
ining "an extensive published record of congressional and popular debate over stock
exchange legislation .... together with documents left by those who wrote the Exchange
Act." Id. at 385.
15. Dooley, supra note 13.
16. Id. at 59.
17. Donald C. Langevoort, The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 and Its Ef
fect on Existing Law, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1273, 1274 (1984).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1273 (citing Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 385-87
(1983); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 382 n.66
(1982); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575,580-81 (1978); see also 2A C. SANDS, STATUTES
AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 49.09 (4th ed. 1973».
20. Id. at 1274.
21. Milton V. Freeman, then a commissioner of the SEC explains the story be
hind the creation of Rule lOb-5:
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quickly adopted Rule lOb-5 to combat this and similar types of
behavior.
It is unclear that the intention of section lO(b) was to fight in
sider trading. However, it is evident, that Rule lOb-5, promulgated
under section lO(b), was adopted with that purpose in mind, and
has been used. to battle insider trading ever since.
B.

Traditional Theory of Insider Trading Liability

The traditional or classic theory of insider trading liability as
envisioned by the Supreme Court22 finds its roots in two cases,
Chiarella v. United States 23 and Dirks v. SEC.24 According to the
It was one day in the year 1943, I believe. I was sitting in my office in the
S.E.C. building in Philadelphia and I received a call from Jim Treanor who was
then the Director of the Trading and Exchange Division. He said, "I have just
been on the telephone with Paul Rowen," who was then the S.E.C. Regional
Administrator in Boston, "and he has told me about the president of some
company in Boston who is going around buying up the stock of his company
from his own shareholders at $4.00 a share, and he has been telling them that
the company is doing very badly, whereas, in fact, the earnings are going to be
quadrupled and will be $2.00 a share for this coming year. Is there anything
we can do about it?" So he came upstairs and I called in my secretary and I
looked at Section 10(b) and I looked at Section 17, and I put them together,
and the only discussion we had there was where "in connection with the
purchase or sale". should be, and we decided it should be at the end.
We called the Commission and we got on the calendar, and I don't re
member whether we got there that morning or after lunch. We passed a piece
of paper around to all the commissioners. All the commissioners read the rule
and they tossed it on the table, indicating approval. Nobody said anything
except Sumner Pike who said, "Well," he said, "we are against fraud, aren't
we?" That is how it happened.
Milton V. Freeman, Remarks at the Meeting of the A.B.A. Section of Corporation,
Banking and Business Law, reprinted in Conference on Codification of the Federal Se
curities Laws, 22 Bus. LAW. 793, 922 (1967).
22. Prior to any Supreme Court cases on the topic, the traditional or classic the
ory had its beginnings in Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961), and SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
23. 445 U.S. 222 (1980). Chiarella was a markup man for a financial printer. His
employer prepared soliciting materials for bidders in tender offers. Chiarella was able
to break the company codes for the material to be printed and he discovered who the
target companies were. He purchased shares in the target companies before the bid
was made public. The announcement of the bid increased the price of shares, and
Chiarella sold his shares for a profit. Chia·rella was convicted under Rule 10b-5. United
States v. Chiarella, 450 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd,
445 U.S. 222 (1980). This conviction was affirmed by the Second Circuit. United States
v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). The Supreme
Court of the United States reversed the conviction, finding no fiduciary duty between
Chiarella and the companies whose stock he had traded. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 237.
24. 463 U.S. 646 (1983). Dirks was an investment analyst. He received informa
tion from a former employee of Equity Funding of America that Equity Funding was
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classic theory, "a person violates Rule lOb-S by trading on material
nonpublic information without disclosing that information to the
marketplace - the essence of the abstain or disclose theory - if
(and presumably only if) he owes a fiduciary duty to marketplace
traders [buyers and sellers of the securities involved in the wrongful
trade]. "25
In Chiarella, the Supreme Court of the United States held that
"one who fails to disclose material information prior to the consum
mation of a transaction commits fraud only when he is under a duty
to do SO."26 The duty the Court is referring to is "[t]he obligation to
disclose or abstain" from trading,27 which comes from Cady, Rob
erts & CO.28 The disclose-or-abstain duty, or the Cady, Roberts
rule, holds that one in possession of confidential, nonpublic infor
mation must either abstain from trading on the information or
make the information available to the marketplace before trading.29
In Cady, Roberts the Securities and Exchange Commission deter
mined that:
[a]n affirmative duty to disclose material information has been
being fraudulently managed and that its assets had been grossly overstated. The em
ployee wanted Dirks to expose the fraud and Dirks succeeded in pUblicizing the infor
mation. However, before publication Dirks told some of his clients to sell their shares
\ in Equity Funding. The SEC instituted an administrative proceeding against Dirks.
Dirks, Release No. 17,480,21 SEC Doc. 1401 (Jan. 22, 1981). The SEC suggested adop
tion of a theory under which the tippee of the confidential information "stands in the
shoes" of the tipper, and assumes the tipper's duty not to misuse the information to his
or her own advantage. The Commission's finding that Dirks had violated Rule lOb-5
was affirmed by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d
824, 846 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The Supreme Court reversed, reiterating its position from
Chiarella, that a fiduciary duty must exist from the defendant to one or more market
place traders to establish Rule lOb-5 liability. Dirks was not liable because he did not
benefit personally from the trading on the inside information.
See Robert B. TItus & Peter G. Carroll, Netting the Outsider: The Need for a
Broader Restatement of Insider Trading Doctrine, 8 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 127 (1986)
for a discussion of the development of the traditional or classic theory.
25. DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING REGULATION, § 1.03(1)(a) at
18 (1991).
26. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228. The Court held that the disclose-or-abstain duty
only arises when a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence exists.
Possession and use of inside information giving one an advantage over other market
participants is not enough to trigger Rule 10b-5 liability. Id. at 228-29.
27. Id. at 227.
28. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). In Cady, Roberts & Co., the SEC imposed sanctions
against a broker who, upon receiving "confidential, nonpublic information" about a
reduction in the dividends of a publicly traded security, told his clients to sell their
holdings. The Commission held that the broker's behavior was in violation of Rule 10b
5 "as a practice which operated as a fraud or deceit upon the purchasers." Id. at 913.
29. Id. at 912-13.
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traditionally imposed on corporate "insiders," particularly of
ficers, directors, or controlling stockholders. We, and the courts
have consistently held that insiders must disclose material facts
which are known to them by virtue of their position but which
are not known to persons with whom they deal and which, if
known, would affect their investment judgment.3o
In Chiarella, the Supreme Court determined that the Cady,
Roberts "duty to disclose arises when one party has information
'that the other [party] is entitled to know because of a fiduciary or
other similar relation of trust and confidence between them.' "31
Thus, those who are found not to have a fiduciary relationship to
either the buyer or seller of stocks are free to trade for personal
benefit, even though they possess confidential, inside information.
The duty to disclose does not arise "from mere possession of non
public market information;" there must be a special relationship be
tween the person possessing the inside information and the buyer
or seller of the securities giving rise to the duty.32 The Court in
Chiarella reversed the convictions, holding that Chiarella was not
an insider because he received no confidential information from the
companies whose stocks he purchased, and thus he owed no duty to
the stockholders of these corporations. 33
If a fiduciary relationship is found between the person who
trades on the inside information and the stockholders of the corpo
ration on which the person has traded, there is a breach of the fidu
ciary duty and Rule lOb-5 liability may attach. 34 This traditional or
classic theory enunciated in Chiarella serves an important function
in the war against insider trading. However, in order to bring more
activity under the insider trading umbrella, such as trading by tip
pees35 and remote tippees,36 there was a need to enlarge the
Chiarella formula. The traditional theory was expanded three years
30. Id. at 911 (discussing the disclosure aspect of the disclose-or-abstain duty).
31. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 551(2)(a) (1976)).
32. Id. at 235.
33. [d. at 231-35. The Court rejected the "equal access" theory from Cady, Rob
erts which states that anyone with inside information owes a general duty to disclose-or
abstain not just to the stockholders of the corporation being traded, but to the entire
marketplace. According to the theory, liability is based on unfairness to the market and
all traders should have "equal access" to information. Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912.
34. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228-29.
35. "Tippee" is defined as any person "who receive[s] material nonpublic infor
mation from a corporate insider [and] may, under certain circumstances, be subject to
abstain or disclose liability under Rule 10b-5." LANGEVOORT, supra note 25, § 4.01 at
101 (1991).
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later in Dirks v. SEC,37 when the Court illuminated the problem of
tippee liability.38
C.

Tippee Liability

The liability of the tippee39 is based upon the tipper's breach of
a fiduciary duty. The Chiarella Court stated, "[t]he tippee's obliga
tion has been viewed as arising from his role as a participant after
the fact in the insider's breach of a fiduciary duty."40 For the tippee
to be liable, the tipper must have committed a wrongful act by dis
closing the inside information to the tippee.
The concept of tippee liability was clarified in Dirks v. SEC. 41
The Dirks Court announced a test to determine tippee liability.42
A tippee will only be held liable if: (1) the insider (tipper)
breached a fiduciary duty and (2) the outsider (tippee) knew or
should have known about the tipper's breach. 43 In effect, Dirks
made the extension of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 liability to tip
pees more practical by enunciating an applicable rule.
Under the Dirks test, to find the insider, and thus the outsider,
liable for a breach of a fiduciary duty, there must be a personal
benefit to the insider from the disclosure. 44 In Dirks, the Court
found no such personal benefit or gain from the breach; therefore,
36. A remote tippee is anyone who obtains confidential inside information from a
tippee beyond the original tip by the insider. See id. at § 4.04(3).
37. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
38. Id. at 655-67.
39. . See supra note 35 for definition of tippee.
40. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 n.12 (1980).
41. 463 U.S. 646 (1983). See supra note 24 for the facts of Dirks.
42. Id. at 660. The Court stated:
Thus, the test is whether the insider personally will benefit, directly or indi
rectly, from his disclosure. Absent some personal gain, there has been no
breach of duty to stockholders. And absent a breach by the insider, there is no
derivative breach. . . . This requires courts to focus on objective criteria, i.e.,
whether the insider receives a direct or indirect personal benefit from the dis
closure, such as a pecuniary gain or a reputational benefit that will translate
into future earnings . . . . There are objective facts and circumstances that
often justify such an inference. For example, there may be a relationship be
tween the insider and the recipient that suggests a quid pro quo from the lat
ter, or an intention to benefit the particular recipient. The elements of
fiduciary duty and exploitation of nonpublic information also exist when an
insider makes a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend.
The tip and trade resemble trading by the insider himself followed by a gift of
the profits to the recipient.
Id. at 662-64 (citations omitted); see LANGEVOORT, supra note 25, § 4.01-04.
43. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660.
44. See supra note 42.
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no liability attached to either the insider or his tippee. 45 Mere pos
session of the inside information is not enough, tippees are only
derivatively liable if the information "has been made available to
them improperly" by breach of a fiduciary duty by the insider to the
shareholders.46
Dirks built upon the Chiarella v. United States 47 decision by
following the Court's "requirement of a specific relationship be
tween the shareholders and the individual trading on inside infor
mation."48 However, the Dirks Court expanded this rule to allow a
tippee to derive a disclose-or-abstain duty to the corporation's
shareholders even when no specific relationship exists between the
tippee and the shareholder. The Court recognized that "the tip
pee's duty to disclose or abstain is derivative from that of the in
sider's duty."49 As to the tippee, the Court held that
a tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a corpor
ation not to trade on material nonpublic information only when
the insider has breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by
disclosing the information to the tippee and the tippee knows or
should know that there has been a breach.5o

When a tippee relays the information to another outsider, the
original tippee becomes, in a sense, a tipper and the one receiving
the information is referred to as a remote tippee. 51 According to
the chain theory of remote tippees, a tippee with a derivative fiduci
ary duty is capable of bringing others into the scheme beyond the
intent or awareness of the original insider. 52 The chain theory cre
ates a chain of persons with a duty to disclose, provided it can be
proven that each person in the chain
(1) was given the information expressly for the purpose of facili
tating trading based on inside information, (2) knew that the in
formation was material and not public, and (3) knew or had
45. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 667. Dirks received no personal gain from the disclosure;
he was just trying to publicize the fraud of Equity Funding. Thus, the Court found no
breach of a fiduciary duty. This case is the exception to the rule. See supra note 42 for
the minimal requirements to be satisfied as to personal gain. Usually it is very easy to
find personal benefit or gain on the part of the insider. Courts require as little as an
increase in reputation, or the good feeling one gets from helping a friend.
46. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660.
47. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
48. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 655.
49. Id. at 659.
50. Id. at 660.
51. See supra note 36 for a definition of remote tippee.
52. LANGEVOORT, supra note 25, § 4.04 at 124-25.
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reason to know that it came to him as a result of some breach of
duty by an insider.53
However, even with the expansion of insider trading prosecu
tions under the Dirks theory, courts were having difficulty regulat
ing certain behavior that appeared to be culpable, but did not fit·
within the Chiarella-Dirks formula. This predicament led the Sec
ond Circuit to adopt the misappropriation theory.54
D.

Misappropriation Theory

The misappropriation theory provides that a Rule 10b-S viola
tion occurs "when a person (1) misappropriates material nonpublic
information (2) by breaching a duty arising out of a relationship of
trust and confidence and (3) uses that information in a securities
transaction, (4) regardless of whether he owed any duties to the
shareholders of the traded stock."55 The misappropriation theory
had its beginnings in a dissent by Chief Justice Burger in Chiarella
v. United States .56 Chief Justice Burger believed that section 10(b)
and Rule lOb-S liability should have attached to the defendant and
stated that Chiarella "misappropriated-stole to put it bluntly
valuable nonpublic information entrusted to him in the utmost
confidence."57
The Second Circuit took the Chief Justice's lead and put the
misappropriation theory into effect. 58 Focusing on the language
"fraud or deceit upon any person" from the text of Rule lOb-5,59
the Second Circuit held that the "fraud and deceit" may be perpe
trated on the source of the nonpublic information, even though the
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S.
1053 (1985).
55. SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 443 (9th Cir. 1990). See Robert B. Titus & Peter
G. Carroll, supra note 24, at 127 for a discussion of the development of the misappro
priation theory.
56. 445 U.S. 222, 239-45 (1980) (Burger, c.J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 245; see Mark A. Clayton, Comment, The Misappropriation Theory in
Light of Carpenter and the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of
1988, 17 PEPP. L. REV. 185, 192 (1989) ("Although criticized, Chief Justice Burger's
dissenting opinion stimulated the development of the misappropriation theory." Id.
(footnote omitted)).
58. The misappropriation theory was first applied in the cases United States v.
Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 13 (2d Cir. 1981), affd, 722 F.2d 729 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 863 (1983) and SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 201 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471
U.S. 1053 (1985).
59. See supra note 2 for the text of Rule 10b-5.
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source may be unconnected to the buyer or seller of the securities.60
Thus, unlike the traditional theory of insider trading liability, also
known as the disclose-or-abstain theory, under the misappropria
tion theory, the fraud is not premised upon a duty to disclose to the
shareholders of the traded stock or abstain from trading; "[i]nstead,
the [Second Circuit in SEC v. Materia 61 ] found that the misappro
priation of confidential information which defrauds the source [in
sider] satisfies Rule 10b-5's requirement that the fraud operate 'on
any person.' "62 "These holdings were consistent with the language
of Rule 10b-5, which contains no specific requirement that fraud be
perpetrated upon the seller or buyer of securities. "63 Thus, under
the misappropriation theory, it is not necessary for the fraud to be
against the buyer or seller of securities; just so long as there is fraud
perpetrated against the source [insider] of the inside information, a
breach exists under Rule 10b-5.
The misappropriation theory has applications in the cases of
remote tippees64 also. Most courts that have treated the issue of
remote tippees under the misappropriation theory have applied the
same approach the Dirks Court used under the disclose-or-abstain
theory.65 "[O]utsiders who participate with a fiduciary in a 'co-ven
ture' to breach a duty are held responsible for all the consequences
flowing therefrom as if they were fiduciaries themselves."66 Thus,
tippees are treated as inheriting a derivative fiduciary duty from the
tipper, whether under the misappropriation or classic theory; "the
only difference is that under the misappropriation theory the tippee
is part of a fraud on the source [insider] of the information, rather
than any marketplace traders."67
The Second Circuit has applied the misappropriation theory in
the employment relations context only, involving situations in
which an employee has misappropriated information from an em
60. See United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1032 (2d Cir. 1986), affd, 484
U.S. 19 (1987); see also United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 566 (2d Cir. 1991) (en
bane), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1759 (1992).
61. 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984).
62. Jill E. Fisch, Start Making Sense: An Analysis and Proposal for Insider Trad
ing Regulation, 26 GA. L. REv. 179,200 (1991) (footnote omitted).
63. United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 17 (2d Cir. 1981). See supra note 2 for
the text of Rule lOb-5.
64. See supra note 36 and accompanying text for a definition and discussion of
remote tippees.
65. See, e.g., United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 567 (2d Cir. 1991) (en
bane), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1759 (1992).
66. LANGEVOORT, supra note 25, § 6.07 at 197.
67. Id. at 197-98.
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ployer. 68 However, district courts in the Second Circuit have ex
tended the theory to non-employment relationships.69
Since the Chiarella decision, United States v. Carpenter70 is the
only case in which the Supreme Court of the United States has
dealt with the misappropriation theory. The securities fraud con
victions brought pursuant to the misappropriation theory were af
firmed by an evenly divided CourU1 Since an affirmance by an
evenly divided court is "[not] entitled to precedential weight,"72 it is
not clear whether the Supreme. Court endorses the misappropria
tion theory.73 There is some evidence that the Supreme Court may
have, at least tacitly, through dicta, endorsed the misappropriation
theory in Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner.74 The Sec
ond Circuit noted that three other circuits have adopted the misap
propriation theoryJ5
68. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 566 (2d Cir. 1991) (en bane), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1759 (1992); see United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1032 (2d
Cir. 1986) (finding breach of duty by financial columnist to employer newspaper), affd
by an equally divided Court, 484 U.S. 19 (1987); SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197,202 (2d
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985) (finding breach of duty by copyholder to
employer printing company); United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 17 (2d Cir. 1981),
affd, 722 F.2d 729 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983) (finding breach of duty by
investment banker to employer firm).
69. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 566; see, e.g., United States v. Willis, 737 F. Supp. 269
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (denying motion to dismiss where psychiatrist's breach of duty arising
from confidential relationship between psychiatrist and patient resulted in psychiatrist
performing trades based on information obtained from patient); United States v. Reed,
601 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y.) (denying motion to dismiss where son allegedly breached
fiduciary duty to his father, a corporate director), rev'd on other grounds, 773 F.2d 477
(2d Cir. 1985); SEC v. Musella, 578 F. Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (office services man
ager breached duty to employer law firm and its clients by trading on inside information
obtained while in course of his employment).
70. 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986), affd by an equally divided Court, 484 U.S. 19
(1987). In Carpenter, Foster Winans, a columnist for the Wall Street Journal, along with
some of his tippees, traded on inside information Winans had obtained for a column
containing stock market tips. Id. at 1026.
71. Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 24.
72. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 192 (1972) (citing Ohio ex rei. Eaton v. Price,
364 U.S. 263,264 (1960».
73. See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 566 n.3 (2d Cir. 1991) (en bane),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1759 (1992) for an indication whether the Supreme Court has
endorsed the misappropriation theory.
74. 472 U.S. 299 (1985). "We also have noted that a tippee may be liable if he
otherwise 'misappropriate[s] or illegally obtain[s] the information.'" Id. at 313, n.22
(citing Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 665 (1983».
75. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 566; see, e.g., SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 404 (7th Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 966 (1992); SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 440 (9th Cir.
1990); Rothberg v. Rosenbloom, 771 F.2d 818 (3d Cir. 1985), rev'd on other grounds
after remand, 808 F.2d 252 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1017 (1987).
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Although the Supreme Court has not clearly endorsed the mis
appropriation theory,76 it enjoys continued use throughout a
number of the circuits,77 including the Second Circuit in United
States v. Chestman. 78
II.

A.

UNITED STATES V. CHESTMAN 79

Facts

Chestman centers around the takeover of the Waldbaum Cor
poration ("Waldbaum") by the Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea
Company ("A & P"). Waldbaum was a publicly traded company.
Robert Chestman was Keith Loeb's stockbroker. Keith Loeb's
wife, Susan, was the granddaughter of Julia Waldbaum. Julia
Waldbaum was a member of the board of directors of Waldbaum,
Inc., and the wife of its founder. 80 In November of 1986, Julia's son,
Ira Waldbaum, president and controlling shareholder of Waldbaum,
agreed to sell Waldbaum to A & P. The purchase called for Ira to
tender a controlling block of shares of Waldbaum to A & P, at a
higher than market price. 81
Ira told some family members about the pending sale, warning
them to keep it quiet until it went public. Among those whom Ira
told was his sister, Shirley Witkin. Shirley did not intend to tell
Susan, her daughter, about the sale, but was forced to due to un
foreseeable circumstances. 82
Susan was concerned for her mother's health when she was not
at home on a certain day. To dispel Susan's fears, Shirley disre
garded her brother's order, and told her daughter she was not at
home because she had to get her shares to Ira so he could tender
them for her.83 Shirley warned Susan not to disclose this fact to
anyone but her husband. Susan told her husband, Keith Loeb,
about the sale and warned him not to say anything because "it
could possibly ruin the sale."84
76. See supra text accompanying notes 70-74 for a discussion of whether the
Supreme Court has endorsed the misappropriation theory.
77. See supra note 75 for a list of cases employing the misappropriation theory in
the circuits.
78. 947 F.2d at 564.
79. 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1759 (1992).
80. Id. at 555.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 579.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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Keith alleged he contacted his broker, Robert Chestman, on
November 26, and told him about the sale. That same day,
Chestman executed several purchases of Waldbaum stock, includ
ing 1,000 shares for Keith Loeb's account.85 Chestman claimed he
bought the stock based on his own independent research. He also
denied having spoken to Keith Loeb on that day.86 Keith Loeb
agreed to cooperate with the government. In so doing, Keith was
required to disgorge the $2S,000 profit from the purchase and sale
of the stock, and pay an additional $2S,000 fine. 87
On July 20, 1988 Chestman was indicted on thirty-one counts
of insider trading and perjury, among these were ten counts of se
curities fraud in violation of Rule 10b-S.88 At trial, a jury found
Chestman guilty on all counts. 89 On appeal, a panel of the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the' convictions on all thirty-one
counts.90 The court held that a fiduciary duty did not exist as re
quired under Rule 10b-S.91 The Second Circuit reheard the case en
banc and upheld the reversal of the Rule lOb-S convictions.92 The
Supreme Court of the United States denied the case further
review. 93
B.

Majority Opinion 94

Robert Chestman's Rule 10b-S convictions were based on the
misappropriation theory.95 Chestman was convicted as the tippee
of Keith Loeb. Thus, Keith Loeb was the alleged misappropriator
of the nonpublic information. For this reason, the court's analysis
focuses on the existence or non-existence of a fiduciary relationship
85. Id. at 555.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 556.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. United States v. Chestman, 903 F.2d 75, 84-86 (2d Cir. 1990), vacated, 947
F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en bane) (holding that the evidence did not support a convic
tion), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1759 (1992).
91. See infra text accompanying notes 94-119 discussing the en bane opinion in
Chestman, which upheld the finding of the panel, that a fiduciary duty did not exist.
92. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 554 (2d Cir. 1991) (en bane), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1759 (1992). The court affirmed the convictions in violation of section
14(e) and Rule 14e-3(a), reversed the convictions of mail fraud, and did not consider
the perjury conviction. Id.
93. Chestman v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1759 (1992).
94. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 554 (2d Cir. 1991) (en bane), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1759 (1992).
95. See id. at 564. See supra text accompanying notes 55-78 for a discussion of
the misappropriation theory.
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between Keith Loeb and either his wife Susan, or between Keith
and the Waldbaum family.96
The en banc opinion centered around the meaning of a fiduci
ary duty. The court asked the question, "what constitutes a fiduci
ary or similar relationship of trust and confidence in the context of
Rule lOb-5 criminalliability?"97 The court made clear that a fiduci
ary duty cannot be imposed on an insider for merely being en
trusted with confidential information. 98 Relying on its decision in
Walton v. Morgan Stanley & Co. ,99 the court concluded that
"[r]eposing confidential information in another, then, does not by
itself create a fiduciary relationship."I°O
As to the family relationship involved, the court went on to
find that "marriage does not, without more, create a fiduciary rela
tionship."IOI Citing United States v. Reed,lfJ2 the court acknowl
edged that" 'mere kinship does not of itself establish a confidential
relation.' . . . Rather, the existence of a confidential relationship
must be determined independently of a preexisting family relation
ship." 103 The court recognized that under certain circumstances
spouses may become fiduciaries, however, "the marriage relation
ship alone does not impose fiduciary status."I04
Concluding that the relationships between Keith and Susan
See id. at 570-71.
97. Id. at 567. See note 31 and accompanying text for the source of the phrase
being interpreted by the Chestman court.
98. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 567 (referring to Walton v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 623
F.2d 796, 799 (2d Cir. 1980) (applying Delaware law». In the Walton case, Morgan
Stanley was an investment bank that obtained confidential material concerning possible
takeover targets for one of its clients. The material was obtained from Olinkraft, one of
the targets. Walton, 623 F.2d at 797. When the planned takeover was abandoned by its
client, Morgan Stanley was charged with trading on the Olinkraft stock, based on the
confidential information. Id. at 797-98. The Second Circuit found that Morgan Stanley
in fact owed Olinkraft no fiduciary duty. Id. at 799. Although Olinkraft gave the infor
mation to Morgan Stanley intending that they keep it confidential, Morgan Stanley was
under no duty to do so. Id.
99. 623 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1980).
100. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 568.
101. Id.
102. 601 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 773 F.2d 477 (2d Cir.
1985). Reed involved the passing of inside information from a father to his son. The
father, the corporate director of a company, was designated the insider while the son
was the one to whom the information was tipped. Id.
103. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 568 (citing Reed,. 601 F. Supp. at 706 (quoting
GEORGE G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 482, at 300-11 (rev. 2d ed.
1978))) (other citations omitted).
104. Id. The court did not elaborate as to what circumstances may give rise to
spouses being considered fiduciaries.
96.
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and between Keith and the Waldbaum family were not fiduciary,
the court inquired whether a "similar relationship of trust and con
fidence" existed under Rule lOb-S. loS The court reasoned that the
word "similar" suggested that a relationship of trust and confidence
must have the same characteristics as a fiduciary relationship.l06
The court claimed that to ignore the significance of the word "simi
lar" would leave the possible interpretations of a relationship of
trust and confidence too expansive. The court noted that this inter
pretation would bring it back to the standard rejected in Walton v.
Morgan Stanley & Co. :107 that the mere possession of c,onfidential
information could result in Rule lOb-5 liability. lOS The court con
cluded, "[ a] 'similar relationship of trust and confidence,' therefore,
must be the functional equivalent of a fiduciary relationship."109
In examining whether a similar relationship of trust or confi
dence existed, the court inquired into the characteristics of a fiduci
ary relationship. According to the court, "[a] fiduciary relationship
involves discretionary authority and dependency: One person de
pends on another-the fiduciary-to serve his interests. "110
The Chestman court distinguished United States v. Reed l11
from the facts before it. 112 Without such a distinction, Reed could
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. 623 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1980).
108. Id. See supra note 98 and accompanying text for a discussion of Walton.
109. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 568.
110. Id. at 569. The court explained:
In relying on a fiduciary to act for his benefit, the beneficiary of the relation
may entrust the fiduciary with custody over property of one sort or another.
Because the fiduciary obtains access to this property to serve the ends of the
fiduciary relationship, he becomes duty-bound not to appropriate the property
for his own use. What has been said of an agent's duty of confidentiality ap
plies with equal force to other fiduciary relations: "an agent is subject to a
duty to the principal not to use or to communicate information confidentially
given him by the principal or acquired by him during the course of or on ac
count of his agency." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395 (1958).
These characteristics represent the measure of the paradigmatic fiduciary rela
tionship. A similar relationship of trust and confidence consequently must
share these qualities.
Id.
111. 601 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 773 F.2d 477 (2d Cir.
1985).
112. 947 F.2d at 569. Both Reed and Chestman involve insider trading tippee
liability in the family relationship context. Since the district court in Reed had found
that a fiduciary relationship did exist between the father and son, the Second Circuit in
Chestman distinguished the Reed holding, because the court found no such relationship
present in Chestman. Id. at 570.
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be interpreted as lending support to the finding of a fiduciary or
similar relationship of trust and confidence in all situations involv
ing family relationships. Instead, the Chestman court chose to limit
Reed to its essential holding:
[T]he repeated disclosure of business secrets between family
members may substitute for a factual finding of dependence and
influence and thereby sustain a finding of the functional
equivalent of a fiduciary relationship. We note, in this regard,
that Reed repeatedly emphasized that the father and son "fre
quently discussed business affairs. "113

The Chestman court recognized that "equity has occasionally
established a less rigorous threshold for a fiduciary-like relation
ship[,]"114 but declined to do so, observing that "[u]seful as such an
elastic and expedient definition of confidential relations, i.e., rela
tions of trust and confidence, may be in the civil context, it has no
place in the criminallaw."115 The court concluded that to apply an
equity standard "for determining the presence of criminal fraud
would offend not only the rule of lenity but due process as well."116
The court applied its interpretation of the fiduciary duty law to
the facts of the case. The government needed to prove two ele
ments: (1) Keith Loeb breached a fiduciary duty to Susan or to the
Waldbaum family and (2) Robert Chestman knew that Loeb had
done SO.117 On the first element, the court found the evidence was
insufficient to show that a "fiduciary relationship or its functional
equivalent" existed between Loeb and the Waldbaum family or be
tween Loeb and Susan.11 8 Alternatively, the court held that the
government failed to meet its burden in proving the second element
that Chestman knew or should have known about the breach of
113. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 569 (quoting Reed, 601 F. Supp. at 690); see also Reed,
601 F. Supp. at 705, 709, 717-18.
114. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 569.
115. Id. at 570.
116. Id.; see Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 n.20 (1980). The
Chestman court recognized "that equity has occasionally established a less rigorous
threshold for a fiduciary-like relationship in order to right civil wrongs." Chestman, 947
F.2d at 569. The court also observed that equity has tended to invoke the confidential
relation doctrine "whenever ... a suitable occasion has arisen." Id. (quoting United
States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685,712 n.38 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (quoting GEORGE G. Bo
GERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 482, at 284-86)). Despite the previous use
of this test, the Second Circuit in Chestman refused to apply the "suitable occasion"
test, claiming it had no place in the criminal law. Id. at 570.
117. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 570.
118. Id. at 570-71.
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fiduciary duty.119

C. Dissenting Opinion 120
Judge Winter found the best way to understand the Supreme
Court's decisions in insider trading cases was in terms of a "busi
ness-property" rationale: 121
Information is perhaps the most precious commodity in commer
cial markets. It is expensive to produce, and, because it involves
facts and ideas that can be easily photocopied or carried in one's
head, there is a ubiquitous risk that those who pay to produce
information will see others reap the profit from it. 122
In applying this analysis to the family-controlled corporation
context, Judge Winter concluded "that family members who have
benefitted from the family's control of the corporation are under a
duty not to disclose confidential corporate information that comes
to them in the ordinary course of family affairs."l23
Judge Winter proposed a test to apply to the family relation
ship in the family-controlled corporation context to find a fiduciary
relationship as required by section lO(b) and Rule lOb-5:
I thus believe that a family member (i) who has received or ex
pects (e.g., through inheritance) benefits from family control of a
corporation, here gifts of stock, (ii) who is in a position to learn
confidential corporate information through ordinary family inter
actions, and (iii) who knows that under the circumstances both
the corporation and the family desire confidentiality, has a duty
not to use information so obtained for personal profit where the
use risks disclosure. 124
In applying his test to the facts of Chestman, Judge Winter found
that the relationship between Keith Loeb and Susan Loeb and be
tween Keith Loeb and the Waldbaum family met the requirements
119. Id. at 570. The second requirement, that the tippee knew or had reason to
know, has not been entirely consistent in its application. Sometimes the standard ap
pears to be something closer to actual knowledge than "reason to know." Compare
SEC v. Musella, 578 F. Supp. 425, 434-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) with SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d
197, 202 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985). See Groskaufmanis, supra
note 10, at 19 for a proposition that the Chestman court changed the standard to actual
knowledge.
120. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 571 (Winter, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 576; see Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Eviden
tiary Privileges, and the Production of Information, 1981 SUP. Cr. REV. 309-39.
122. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 576-77 (citing Easterbrook, supra note 121, at 313).
123. Id. at 579.
124. Id. at 580.
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and would result in the finding of a fiduciary duty and liability
under Rule lOb-S. I25

III.
A.

ANALYSIS

Fiduciary v. Trust and Confidence: Is There a Distinction?

A fiduciary relationship is a relationship that has been given
special status by the law. In such relationships the law imposes a
fiduciary duty on persons with certain legal relationships to one an
other regardless of their factual relationship.126 Whereas trust and
confidence relations depend on the facts of a situation and are
found only if there is an actual relationship of dependence between
the parties despite the absence of any formal legal relationship that
would qualify as a fiduciary relationship.127
The court in Chestman incorrectly concluded that there is no
distinction between a fiduciary relation and a relation of trust and
confidence. l28 It states that "[a] 'similar relationship of trust and
confidence,' therefore, must be the functional equivalent of a fidu
ciary relationship."129 The court's conclusion turns on the use of
the word "similar" in the phrase being interpreted. 130 As discussed
earlier, the phrase "fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and
confidence" can be traced back to the Restatement (Second) of
Torts. 131 The problem is that somewhere between Chiarella and
Chestman the configuration of this phrase changed. In Chiarella
the phrase was "fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and con
fidence,"132 while in Chestman the phrase was "fiduciary duty or
similar relationship of trust and confidence."133 Somewhere be
tween the two cases, the word "other" mysteriously disappeared
from the phrase. Although Chiarella dealt with the classic theory
and Chestman dealt with the misappropriation theory, Chiarella, by
way of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, is the source of the
phrase, and courts have applied the phrase in cases dealing with
125. Id. at 580-81.
126. GEORGE G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 481, at 225
(rev. 2d ed. 1978).
127. Id. § 482, at 280.
128. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 568.
129. Id.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 97-100 for the Chestman court's analysis
of a fiduciary duty.
131. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
132. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980) (emphasis added) (quot
ing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a) (1976)).
133. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 566.
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both the classic and misappropriation theories. 134
Once the word "other" is reintroduced, the phrase "fiduciary
or other similar relation of trust and confidence"135 is open to new
interpretations. The use of the word "other" suggests that there is a
distinction between fiduciary and trust and confidence relations.
The phrase could be interpreted to mean that if trust and confi
dence relations have the same characteristics as fiduciary relations
then it would follow that all fiduciary relations could be considered
of trust and confidence. However, because of the special designa
tion of fiduciary relations, not all trust and confidence relations can
be called fiduciary.B 6 The Chestman interpretation creates a prob
lem because it would be redundant for the Restatement to use both
terms, fiduciary and trust and confidence, if they have the same
meaning. If fiduciary and trust and confidence are truly functional
equivalents, it is both repetitive and confusing to use both terms. If
indeed they are synonymous, it would add nothing to the Restate
ment rule to have the term trust and confidence even mentioned.
When the Chestman court erroneously concluded that mar
riage alone fails to create a fiduciary relationship, it relied primarily
on a quote from United States v. Reed. 137 "'[M]ere kinship does not
of itself establish a confidential relation.' Rather, the existence of a
confidential relationship must be determined independently of a
preexisting family relationship."138
The Reed court's authority in concluding that a family relation
is not fiduciary in nature was G.G. Bogert, The Law of Trusts and
Trustees .139 When the court quotes from Bogert, it purports to be
discussing fiduciary duties, but the quote actually comes from Sec
tion 482, titled "Abuse of Confidential Relationship," which dis
cusses trust and confidence relations. 14o Section 481 from Bogert is
the section that discusses fiduciary obligations. 141 Thus, even
134. See, e.g., Chestman, 947 F.2d at 567.
135. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 551(2)(a) (1976».
136. This interpretation comports with some of the distinctions that have been
suggested by previous courts. See infra text accompanying notes 137-61.
137. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 568 (citing United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685,
706 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 773 F.2d 477 (2d Cir. 1985».
138. Reed, 601 F. Supp. at 706 (citations omitted) (quoting BOGERT, supra note
126, § 482 at 300-11).
139. See id.
140. Reed, 601 F. Supp. at 706 (discussing BOGERT, supra note 126) (emphasis
added).
141. BOGERT, supra note 126, § 481 at 225 (this section is titled, "Breach of a
Fiduciary Obligation").

1994]

SECURITIES LAW-UNITED STATES v. CHESTMAN

99

before reaching the discussion of trust and confidence relations,142
the court uses a quote discussing confidential relations to determine
that a fiduciary relation fails to exist. The court's muddled analysis
demonstrates the confusion which exists in dealing with the terms
fiduciary and confidential. It also shows that the Second Circuit
was operating under the presupposition that a distinction between
the terms "fiduciary" and "confidential" did not exist, and thus, was
unable to keep their definitions separate and distinct.
Even Bogert recognizes that a distinction between fiduciary
and confidential relations exists. Bogert points out that "[i]n many
decisions the words [fiduciary relation and confidential relation] are
used as synonyms."143 Bogert goes on to say, "[i]n most cases, how
ever, the latter phrase [confidential relation] is employed to indi
cate a relationship of a character similar to ... fiduciary relations,
but not falling into any well-defined category of the law."l44 Bogert
cites two cases that help delineate this distinction. 145
The court in Roberts v. Parsons l46 held that a distinction be
tween a fiduciary and confidential relation does exist. 147 The court
found that although some courts treat the two as synonymous,
[t]here is, however, a technical distinction between the two terms,
142. See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 568 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1759 (1992).
143. BOGERT, supra note 126, § 482 at 280.
144. Id. Bogert continues:
The relations of trustee and beneficiary, executor or administrator and credi
tors, next of kin or legatees, guardian and ward, principal and agent, attorney
and client, corporate director and corporation, and the like are easily placed
into distinct subdivisions of the law. They have distinctive names. The term
"fiduciary" might well be reserved for such relations.
There are other cases where there is just as great intimacy, disclosure of
secrets, entrusting of power, and superiority of position in the case of the rep
resentative, but where the law has no special designation for the position of
the parties. It cannot be called trust or executorship, and yet it is so similar in
its creation and operation that it should have like results.
Id. at 280-81.
Bogert recognizes a distinction exists between fiduciary and confidential relations,
and comments that where "great intimacy, disclosure of secrets, entrusting of power,
and superiority of position" exist, it is a confidential relationship, and similar results as
those in a fiduciary relation should occur upon a breach. Id.
145. BOGERT, supra note 126, § 481 at 280-81 n.53 (citing Roberts v. Parsons, 242
S.W. 594 (Ky. Ct. App. 1922); Oehler v. Hoffman, 113 N.W.2d 254 (Iowa 1962) (citing
Richard S. Hudson, Contracts in Iowa Revisited-Fraud and Misrepresentation, Duress
and Undue Influence, 9 DRAKE L. REv. 3 (1959))).
146. 242 S.W. 594 (Ky. Ct. App. 1922) (invalidating and canceling deeds and con
tracts between relatives in which a confidential relation existed).
147. Id. at 596.
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the former [fiduciary relation] being more correctly applicable
to legal relationships between the parties . . . while the latter .
[confidential relation] might include them and also every other
relationship wherein confidence is rightfully reposed and is exer
cised, among which, as we have seen, is superiority of knowledge
on the part of the one seeking to uphold the contract and confi
dence reposed in him by the other. 148
The court goes on to say, "it is not necessary that the relationship
should be of that legal nature in order to raise one of trust and
confidence, but that it may under certain circumstances exist be
tween mere relatives ...."149
The court in Oehler v. Hoffman 150 also recognizes the distinc
tion between fiduciary and confidential relations. The court found
that a confidential relation "may exist although there is no fiduciary
relation. It exists when one person has gained the confidence of
another and purports to act or advise with the other's interest in
mind."151 The court concluded that a confidential relationship is
embodied by "the presence of a dominant influence" that the one
party has over the other. 152 The Oehler court cites a Drake Law
Review article,153 and Bogert also makes reference to it in his cita
tion to Oehler.154
The article cited by Oehler, "Contracts in Iowa Revisited
Fraud and Misrepresentation, Duress and Undue Influence"155 rec
ognizes the distinction. The author explained that Iowa courts had
taken the position of treating confidential relationships covered by
section 497 of the Restatement of Contracts in the same manner as
fiduciary relationships referred to in section 498. 156 Hudson made
reference to the distinction between fiduciary and confidential, as
illustrated in the Restatement of Contracts. 157 Hudson correctly
148.· Id.
149. Id. (referring to JOHN W. SMITH, LAW OF FRAUD, § 23 (1907». See infra
text accompanying notes 172-204 for a discussion of family relations as fiduciary or
confidential.
150. 113 N.W.2d 254 (Iowa 1962). The court found a confidential relation did not
exist that would render a deed invalid. The relationship was between an elderly wo
man, and a married couple that did her errands, and were friends with her. Id.
151. Id. at 256.
152. Id.
153. Id.; see also Richard S. Hudson, Contracts in Iowa Revisited-Fraud and
Misrepresentation, Duress and Undue Influence, 9 DRAKE L. REV. 3 (1959).
154. See BOGERT, supra note 126, § 482 at 280-81 n.53.
155. Hudson, supra note 153.
156. See Hudson, supra note 153, at 14-15.
157. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRAcrs §§ 497, 498, at 954-57 (1932).
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identifies section 497 as covering confidential relationships, and sec
tion 498 as covering fiduciary relationships. Comment a to section
497 states: "[t)he relationships that ordinarily fall within the rule are
those of parent and child, guardian and ward, husband and wife
• • • . "158 This comment suggests that in order to determine if a
confidential relationship exists, each relationship must be examined
on a case-by-case basis. "[I)t is a question of fact whether the rela
tionship in a particular case is such as to give one party dominance
over the other, or put him in a position where words of persuasion
have undue weight .... "159
Thus, section 497 of the Restatement identifies a confidential
relation as one characterized by domination or influence. Section
498 covers fiduciary relationships. Comment a to section 498 states
"[t)he rule is more severe than that applicable generally where
there is a confidential relationship. "160 This may have to do with
the fact that the law imposes a special duty on fiduciaries, and the
consequences would be more severe if the fiduciary violated the
obligation. Sections 497 and 498 make clear that the Restatement
distinguishes fiduciary from confidential relationships, and com
ment a to section 498 reinforces this distinction by making "the rule
. . . more severe" if the relationship is fiduciary rather than
confidential. 161
Given the preceding material, a fiduciary relation is viewed as
a relationship, and consequently, a duty the law recognizes through
158. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRAcrs § 497 cmt. a, at 954 (1932) (emphasis added).
See infra text accompanying notes 172-204 for a discussion of marriage constituting a
confidential relationship.
159. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRAcrs § 497 cmt. a, at 955 (1932).
160. Id. § 498 cmt. a (emphasis added).
161. Id. This same distinction in the Restatement of Contracts is carried over in
the Restatement of Contracts, Second. Section 177 in Restatement Second is based on
former § 497. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRAcrs § 177 reporter's note
(1979). Section 177 is essentially the same rule as § 497. Comment a to § 177 explains
as follows: "[r]elations that often fall within the rule include those of parent and child,
husband and wife, clergyman and parishioner, and physician and patient." RESTATE
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRAcrs § 177 cmt. a (emphasis added). Notice that some of
the relationships enumerated in former § 497 have been dropped, but that of husband
and wife and parent and child have been kept intact. See supra text accompanying
notes 172-204 for a discussion of family relations being fiduciary or confidential.
Section 173 of Restatement Second of Contracts is based on former § 498. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRAcrs § 173 reporter's note (1979). Comment a
highlights the distinction between fiduciary and confidential relationships; "[the fiduci
ary rule] is more severe than the rule relating to non-disclosure in the case of one who
stands in a relation of trust and confidence but who is not a fiduciary." Thus, the dis
tinction enunciated in Restatement of Contracts continues to survive in the Restate
ment of Contracts, Second. Id. at cmt. a.
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certain enumerated relationships, such as trustee and beneficiary.
Whereas, a confidential relation, born in equity, defies a precise
definition, but is one where trust and confidence is reposed by one
in another and is marked by reliance and control by the receiver of
the information over the giver of the information~ There is a dis
tinction between fiduciary and confidential, and for the Second Cir
cuit to ignore it by claiming that a confidential relation is the
functional equivalent of a fiduciary relation is to play fast and loose
with the law in the area. The Second Circuit's analysis also ignores
the intent both of the American Law Institute in drafting the Re
statement (Second) of Torts and the Supreme Court, which adopted
the Restatement definition in Chiarella v. United States .162
In going to the very roots of the phrase, "fiduciary or other
similar relation of trust and confidence,"163 it becomes apparent
that a distinction between the two terms does exist. For courts to
ignore one aspect of the analysis by claiming that it is the same as a
separate part of analysis is to disregard the true meaning of the
terms being used. The effect of such a tainted analysis is to create a
loophole in the law of insider trading. Family members and their
tippees involved in family-controlled corporations may evade the
consequences of their wrongful conduct, unlike other market par
ticipants engaging in similar behavior. To ignore the confidential
relationship aspect of the analysis is to leave the inquiry incom
plete. The result is this loophole in insider trading laws involving
family-controlled corporations that ultimately leads to ineffective
enforcement of insider trading laws. Although Judge Winter's pro
posed rule 164 could be used as a weapon against insider trading per
petrated by family members of family-controlled corporations and
their tippees, the rule may be too expansive and is also unnecessary.
Judge Winter's intent was to plug the hole that the majority opinion
created. While Judge Winter's rule may plug the hole effectively, it
may also cause a backlash of water to sweep over the dam. In the
words of Judge Miner, if the proposed rule were adopted "[t]he net
would be spread wider than appropriate in a criminal context. "165
Judge Miner is referring to the possibility that the proposed rule
would sweep in family members undeserving of such treatment,
162. 445 u.s. 222,228 (1980).
163. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
164. See supra text accompanying note 124 for Judge Winter's proposed rule.
165. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 582 (2d Cir. 1991) (en bane)
(Miner, J., concurring), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1759 (1992).
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such as "minor children."l66 Aside from the possibility that the rule
would bring in more people than it should, the rule is unnecessary.
Judge Winter's intent was to create a test in order to identify
certain relationships as fiduciary-at-Iaw. Judge Winter recognizes
the problem created by the majority, but his solution is a judge
made rule that is unnecessary when the answer can be found within
the case law interpreting Rule lOb-So
The courts need only look to the neglected analysis of trust and
confidence relations to deal with the problem involving family-con
trolled corporations. If the court were to use a case-by-case factual
inquiry into the existence of a relationship of trust and confidence
in addition to the usual search for a fiduciary relationship, Rule
lOb-S would be more effective in the context of family-controlled
corporations specifically, as well as prosecutions in general.
The majority in Chestman refused to apply equity standards to
the situation. 167 An in depth inquiry into the law in the area would
have revealed to the court that such a standard is not only proper,
but required. The trust and confidence relationship comes from eq
uity and has always been more flexible than the stricter fiduciary
relationship analysis at law. It follows from the case law that the
Supreme Court would not have adopted the phrase, "fiduciary or
other similar relation of trust and confidence" from the Restatement
(Second) of Torts in Chiarella V. United States l68 unless it intended
that the phrase be used in its entirety. This includes an analysis of
the existence of a relation of trust and confidence using equity stan
dards under which it was established.
In applying a trust and confidence relationship analysis to the
facts of Chestman, the conclusion is reached that the relationship
between Keith Loeb and his wife Susan was sufficient to support a
finding of a confidential relationship. There was confidence and de
pendence on the part of Keith over Susan when Susan disclosed the
inside information to Keith. As the Chestman court indicated, the
mere entrusting of information with another is not enough to create
a fiduciary relationship.169 However, when this entrusting of infor
mation is combined with other factors, it does create the existence
of a relation of trust and confidence. One such factor is that both
Susan and Keith were family members in a family-controlled corpo
166.
167.
refusal to
168.
169.

Id. at 583 (Miner, J., concurring).
See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text for a discussion of the court's
apply equity standards in Chestman. See Chestman, 947 F.2d at 569-70.
445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980).
Chestman, 947 F.2d at 567.
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ration setting. The family-controlled corporation element makes
the family member's situation require more loyalty and confidence
than in a normal family setting.
The evidence also indicated that Keith and Susan had shared
secrets in the past and these confidences were maintained pO This
displays that their relationship was one where there was both confi
dence and dependence. Also of significance was Susan's directive
that Keith not disclose the information to anyone. This demon
strates that there was also an element of reliance in Susan and
Keith's relationship. Analyzing the facts of Chestman under a trust
and confidence relationship standard demonstrates that the rela
tionship between Susan and Keith was one of trust and confidence.
The Chestman court was mistaken in looking only for a fiduci
ary relationship or its functional equivalent. An examination of
Chiarella v. United States l7l and the sources upon which it relied
indicate that a distinction between fiduciary and trust and confi
dence relations does exist, thereby demonstrating the need to per
form a separate inquiry into the existence of a relation of trust and
confidence. And because trust and confidence relations originate
from an equity background, it is appropriate to use such a standard
in performing a trust and confidence relation analysis.
B.

An Analysis of Family Relationships as Either a Fiduciary or
Similar Relation of Trust and Confidence

The court in Chestman found it necessary not only to look for a
fiduciary relationship, but also a similar relationship of trust and
confidence as part of its lOb-5 inquiry.l72 The analysis of the Sec
ond Circuit included this inquiry because when the Supreme Court
first dealt with the insider trading issue in Chiarella,173 it deter
mined that the disclose-or-abstain duty "arises when one [party] has
information 'that the other [party] is entitled to know because of a
fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence between
them."'174 Because the Supreme Court chose to tie the disclose-or
abstain duty to a "fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and
170. Id. at 579.
171. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
172. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 568.
173. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
174. Id. at 228 (emphasis added) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 551(2)(a) (1976». See supra note 31 and accompanying text for the source of the
phrase "fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence."
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confidence,"175 anytime a question of Rule 10b-5 liability arises, the
court must determine if either of these relationships is present.
Since the heart of the court's analysis in Chestman 176 is an in
quiry into the presence of a fiduciary or similar relation of trust and
confidence,177 it is important to understand what relationships these
terms encompass. When the Supreme Court used the phrase "fidu
ciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence" in
Chiarella,178 it actually quoted from the Restatement (Second) of
Torts,179 and included a reference to a law review article on
misrepresentation. 180
The Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 551 deals with
"[l]iability for [n]ondisclosure."181 As can be seen from the text,182
section 551(2)(a) suggests a duty to disclose when a fiduciary or
similar relation of trust and confidence exists between the parties.
Comment f on clause (a) lends some insight as to what constitutes a
fiduciary or trust and confidence relation. 183 The comment states:
[m]embers of the same family normally stand in a fiduciary rela
tion to one another, although it is of course obvious that the fact
that two men are brothers does not establish relation of trust and
confidence when they have become estranged and have not spo
ken to one another for many years. l84

The comment demonstrates that the original source of the
phrase "fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confi
dence"185 recognized that a family relation "normally" is fiduci
175. Id.
176. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert. de
nied, 112 S. Ct. 1759 (1992).
177. Id. at 567. "[W]e tum to our central inquiry-what constitutes a fiduciary or
similar relationship of trust and confidence in the context of Rule 10b-5 criminalliabil
ity?" Id.
178. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228.
179. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a) (1976).
180. Flemming James Jr. & Oscar S. Gray, Misrepresentation-Part II, 37 MD. L.
REv. 488, 525 (1978).
181. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a) (1976) states as follows:
(2) One party to a business transaction is under a duty to exercise reasonable
care to disclose to the other before the transaction is consummated, (a) mat
ters known to him that the other is entitled to know because of a fiduciary or
other similar relation of trust and confidence between them.
Id.
182. See id.
183. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a) cmt. f (1976).
184. Id.
185. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a) (1976).
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ary.186 A family relation may also be of trust and confidence,
however, this depends on a factual inquiry.
In the Reporter's Note for section 551 a case is cited as support
for the comment; the case supports the premise that a family rela
tionship is normally fiduciary or confidential.1 87 In the Enyart case,
the Supreme Court of Nebraska held that even between a future
husband and wife a confidential relationship existed. 188 "It is also a
well-established rule that, in view of the close and confidential rela
tion existing between affianced persons, it is the duty of the pro
spective husband to make a full and fair disclosure ...."189 This
case lends further support for the Restatement's conclusion that a
familial relationship is normally fiduciary or confidential. Despite
this, the Chestman court determined that a husband-wife relation
ship was not fiduciary, nor confidential.1 90 It is of significance that
the Chestman court selectively relies on the authority of the Re
statement, but refuses to accept all the ramifications of such
reliance.
The Restatement and the case it cites tend to contradict the
authority cited by the Second Circuit in Chestman, which held that
a family relation is not fiduciary.191 These authorities, in turn, lend
support for finding a fiduciary relation among family members of a
family-controlled corporation. This support is based on the fact
that if family relations have been deemed fiduciary by past case law,
it would follow that a family relation with an added element of a
family-controlled corporation could support a finding of a fiduciary
or similar relation of trust and confidence even more so than a sim
ple family relationship. In fact, Judge Winter points out that it is
this family-controlled corporation context that is so important to
the analysis and that is entirely ignored by the majority opinion. 192
186. Id. at cmt. f.
187. In re Enyart's Estate, 160 N.W. 120 (Neb. 1916), overruled in part by Kings
ley v. Noble, 263 N.W. 222 (Neb. 1935). The court held that a future husband and wife
stood in a confidential relation, which imposed a duty of full disclosure on the husband
to tell of his true net worth before having his wife sign an antenuptial agreement. The
court allowed the wife to cancel the agreement and receive what she was allowed under
law because the husband failed to disclose such information. Id.
188. Enyart, 160 N.W. at 120.
189. Id. at 123 (emphasis added).
190. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 568-70 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1759 (1992).
191. Id. at 568 ("Kinship alone does not create the necessary relationship." Id.)
(citing United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685,706 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds,
773 F.2d 477 (2d Cir. 1985) (quoting BOGERT, supra note 126, § 482 at 300-11».
192. Id. at 580 (Winter, J., dissenting).
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Further support for the contention that a family relation is one
of trust and confidence is found in the law review article cited by
the Supreme Court in Chiarella. 193 The James & Gray article on
misrepresentation states that the duty to disclose "has been ex
tended to relations of trust and confidence beyond technical
trusts."194 In the footnote supporting this assertion, it says,
"[m]embers of the same family often stand in such a relationship to
each other that full disclosure is required, but this may be varied by
circumstances."195 It seems to follow that in a family-controlled
corporation context there is no need to vary the finding of a fiduci
ary or similar relation of trust and confidence. In fact, it is this ad
ded element which calls for the finding of a fiduciary or other
similar relation of trust and confidence beyond that found in a nor
mal family relationship. Thus, both sources cited by the Supreme
Court in Chiarella for the proposition that a duty to disclose arises
when "a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence"
exists,196 lend support to the contention that a family relation may
qualify as either fiduciary or confidential.1 97
In Appeal of Darlington,198 a case cited by the James & Gray
article, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania attempted to define a
confidential relation, and in so doing listed some accepted
examples.
The confidential relation is not at all confined to any specific as
sociation of the parties to it. While its more frequent illustrations
are between persons who are related as trustee and cestui que
trust, guardian and ward, attorney and client, parent and child,
husband and wife, it embraces partners and copartners, principal
and agent, master and servant, physician and patient, and gener
193.

Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 n.9 (1980) (citing James & Gray,

supra note 180, at 523-27).
194. James & Gray, supra note 180, at 525.
195. Id. at n.11. In this same footnote the authors cite other sources for "[I]ists of
confidential relationships." Id. These sources include: Appeal of Darlington, 23 A.
1046, 1047 (Pa. 1892); David Berger & Joanne Hirsch, Pennsylvania Tort Liability for
Concealment and Nondisclosure in Business Transactions, 21 TEMP. L.Q. 368, 371 n.17
(1948); William B. Goldfarb, Fraud and Nondisclosure in the Vendor-Purchaser Rela
tion, 8 W. RES. L. REV. 5, 32 (1956).
196. The sources cited by the Supreme Court are RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 551(2)(a) (1976) and James & Gray, supra note 180.
197. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228. See supra text accompanying notes 172-95 for a
discussion showing that the sources cited by the Chiarella Court support the proposition
that a family relationship can be either fiduciary or confidential.
198. 23 A. 1046 (Pa. 1892). In Appeal of Darlington, the court invalidated a note
for $7,000, signed by an uncle to his nephew, because of the existence of a confidential
relation between the two, created by a close, dependency relationship. Id.
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ally all persons who are associated by any relation of trust and
confidence.199

The James & Gray article cited a Western Reserve Law Review arti
cle titled Fraud and Nondisclosure in the Vendor-Purchaser Relation
for support. 2oo The article, written by William B. Goldfarb, identi
fies some specific trust and confidence relations. "Certain relation
ships may be called fiduciary-in-Iaw. They are the classical
relationships of trust and confidence. They include, among others,
attorney and client, officers of a corporation and shareholders ...
and siblings [to each other]."201
Applying Appeal of Darlington and the Goldfarb article to
Chestman, it seems to follow that a fiduciary or similar relation of
trust and confidence can be found between either Keith and Susan,
as husband and wife, or between Keith and the Waldbaum family,
as family members in a family-controlled corporation. There is a
plethora of authority from the common law that points to the con
clusion that a family relationship in certain contexts can be of a
fiduciary quality.202 When this family relation is put into a family
controlled corporation context, it is even more compelling to find a
fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence.
The Securities and Exchange Commission expressed a similar
position in its amicus curiae brief in support of the rehearing en
banc in Chestman. "[F]amily members, and especially husbands
and wives, do not typically deal with each other at arm's length, and
the characteristics of family relationships do not resemble those of
companies dealing with each other in the general business world
...."203 Family members should know, when they are privy to in
side information solely because of their relationship within the fam
ily, that such information should stay within the family, and it is not
something they should be allowed to pass on to others with no ac
countability for such actions. Thus, the Chestman court failed to
consider the added element of a family-controlled corporation and
incorrectly concluded that a family relation within the context of a
family-controlled corporation is not fiduciary or confidential in
nature.
199.
200.

[d. at 1047 (emphasis added).
Goldfarb, supra note 195.
201. [d. at 32 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
202. See supra text accompanying notes 172-201 for authorities supporting prem
ise that a family relationship is fiduciary.
203. Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission at 14, United States v.
Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (No. 89-1276).
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The majority opinion says that a family relation is not fiduci
ary. What the majority opinion ignores is the surrounding circum
stances. This is not just a family relation per se, it is a family
relation within the context of a family-controlled corporation. The
majority opened the door to this interpretation when it said,
"[a]lthough spouses certainly may by their conduct become fiducia
ries, the marriage relationship alone does not impose fiduciary sta
tUS."204 When this admission that spouses can become fiduciaries
through their conduct is added to the inquiry, it makes it possible to
find a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence
under the facts involved, namely the added element of a family
controlled corporation. Therefore, there is support for the conclu
sion that a family relationship is fiduciary, in contrast to what the
majority found. And when the family-controlled corporation con
text is added to the situation, a finding of a relationship of trust and
confidence is all the more probable.
CONCLUSION

Family members of family-controlled, publicly traded corpora
tions and their tippees should not be allowed to disclose informa
tion and perform trades that would be unlawful if in the hands of
other market participants. The Second Circuit's decision in
Chestman allows just such behavior on the part of family-controlled
corporation family members and their tippees. Not only did the
decision create this safe harbor for family members and their tip
pees, but the decision is not based on a credible canvass of the law
in the area.
As demonstrated by the case law, a family relation is capable
of being fiduciary or confidential in nature. When the family-con
trolled corporation context is added to the analysis, it makes even
more sense to find a fiduciary or confidential relation. Also sup
ported by the case law is the conclusion that a distinction between
fiduciary and confidential relationships does exist. Confidential re
lations require an inquiry into the facts behind each relationship,·
unlike a fiduciary relationship which is given special designation by
law. A factual inquiry into the existence of a confidential relation
ship on a case-by-case basis is both supported by the law in the area
and represents the best method of netting family members and their
tippees who deal in nonpublic inside information in the family-con
204. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 568 (1991) (en bane), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 1759 (1992).
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trolled corporation context. This is the best way to level the playing
field and take away the unfair advantage family members and their
tippees enjoy over the rest of the marketplace in dealing with inside
information.
William A. Snider

